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TMA International Trusts Exposes U.S. Supreme Court IN Fraud
U.S SUPREME COURT DISPLAYS SUPREME ARROGANCE AS THEY CONTINUE TO OPERATE WITH FRAUDULENT CRIMINAL RULES.
On December 1, 2002, the federal government committed an egregious, reprehensible, illegal overt act, part and parcel to what can only be described as a "Conspiracy,’ to Usurp Power from the 50 States and the American People, and, attempt to redefine the U.S. Constitution as it relates to federal jurisdiction. It appears from the evidence that most of Congress was defrauded, which was easy because Congress wasn’t paying attention, just going through the motions as they are today continuing to ignore this fraud. The American People were clearly defrauded; and, it is undeniable the U.S. Constitution was intentionally violated. Considering the actors, it rises to the level of "Treason." This outrageous conduct also coincides with the Patriot Act I & II.
This document is proprietary data compiled by TMA International Trusts’ Think Tank with the help of Trial Management Associates. This information has been posted at the web site of States’ Rights Journal.
http://www.statesrightsjournal.com/index.php?inc=essays/essay.inc&lastName=&essay_id=108
BACKGROUND:
A sovereignty’s criminal jurisdiction [whether it be a State, or, the Federal Government], or power to deal with crime, depends upon its jurisdiction or power over persons or property.
JURISDICTION OVER PERSONS
In ascertaining criminal jurisdiction or power of a sovereignty over persons, the Anglo-American courts apply one or another of three principles. These are the principles of territoriality, citizenship, and domicile. They conflict with each other. Sometimes confusion results whenever two of them are not eliminated or subordinated. Fortunately, the courts do not employ the domicile principle in determining a sovereignty’s criminal jurisdiction over crime.
The general rule is that a sovereignty has power or criminal jurisdiction over all persons in its territory, and has no power or jurisdiction over persons within the territory of another sovereignty. This is reality; however, our U.S. Constitution (Constitution) allows it to become more than this due to a second conflict of laws principle. This second principle is that the law applicable to an individual is the law to which he was subject at the time of the acts or omissions the legal effect of which are in question, [federal v. state]. This distinction of laws principle is part of the common law of the forum. It shouldn’t be a problem because the federal government’s power is clearly stated in the Constitution in Article I, Sec. 8:
Article I. Section 8:
Clause 1: The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
Clause 2: To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
Clause 3: To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;
Clause 4: To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
Clause 5: To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;
Clause 6: To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;
Clause 7: To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
Clause 8: To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;
Clause 9: To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
Clause 10: To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;
Clause 11: To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
Clause 12: To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
Clause 13: To provide and maintain a Navy;
Clause 14: To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
Clause 15: To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
Clause 16: To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
Clause 17: To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;—And
Clause 18: To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
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The federal government’s constitutional criminal jurisdiction outside the "federal zone’ [federal zone is the District of Columbia, Territories owned, and federal enclaves {insular possessions} within the states] is (1) treason (Art. III Sec. 3 Cl. 2); (2) counterfeiting (Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 6); (3) piracy or felonies on the high seas; (4) offenses against the "laws of nations" (Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 10); or (5) violations of discipline by military or militia personnel (Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 14).
In modern times we are concerned here with the problem of what law governs [federal or state], or, which is to be applied to determine whether or not an act is criminal. The general principle applied is the territorial principle. The rule as generally stated is that the courts of the state where the crime is committed have jurisdiction. This is highly inaccurate. We have already seen with time how the Federal Court’s assume jurisdiction over the person accused based on their custody.
What is normally referred to, then, is not the jurisdiction of the court, but (1) the principle that the courts try the accused only when the law of their own sovereignty has been violated, and (2) that the law violated is the law of the place where the crime is committed.
The conflict in the decisions upon this question is largely due to two conflicting principles. They are:
(1) The law of the place where an act or omission takes effect or produces an injury governs or determines whether or not the act or omission is criminal.
(2) The law of the place where the accused was at the time of the act or omission governs or determines whether or not the act or omission is criminal.
Our Constitution dictates that the latter is to be followed. It is in accord with the general principle that a sovereignty has power or jurisdiction over all persons in its territory and no power or jurisdiction over persons within the territory of another sovereignty. At the time of the act or omission the state in which the actor was located has actual physical power over him. If the law of that state applies, its enforcement officers are in a position to enforce the law. They have actual power to arrest the actor. At the time of the act or omission, the sovereignty [federal government] in which the effect is produced has no actual physical control over the actor. If its law applies, its enforcement officers are not in a position to enforce it. They cannot go into the territory of the other sovereignty to make the arrest. [This is one way the federal government has gotten itself in serious trouble with making arrests in foreign sovereign territories; and, thinking in some cases their federal courthouses had been ceded over to them by the state in which it physically sits, hence making the actual arrest at the federal courthouse, when in fact most federal courthouses sit in exclusive state jurisdiction as there has been no cession of jurisdiction {See Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 17 – U.,S. Constitution; Title 40 U.S.C., Sec. 255; Department of Justice Criminal Resource Manual Sec.s’ 664 & 665}; and, State cession laws]. If the actor remains there, the sovereignty in which the effect is produced will be obliged to apply to the other sovereignty to surrender or extradite him. Between independent sovereignties the actor can be extradited only for those crimes specified in the treaty, if one exists. Between States of the united States [See Declaration of Independence and Blacks Law definition of "United States’ to understand difference between "united States’ {50 States} and "United States’ {federal government}] he could not be extradited at all, because he is not a fugitive. Thus, the sovereignty in which an effect is produced can only apply its law to a few of the instances where an effect is produced within its territory. In regards to the federal government they can only legally enforce their criminal statutes that fall outside Sec. 8 of the Constitution if the act occurred within what is known as the "Federal Zone.’ It is made up of the District of Columbia, Territories owned by the federal government, and insular possessions [federal enclaves], which are geographical locations within the 50 states that have been ceded over from the state, and accepted formally by the federal government, via cession of jurisdiction. This is why the definition of "Act of Congress’ that was found in Rule 54 (c) – Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCrP) 2002 edition states:
"Any act of Congress, locally applicable to and in force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession.’
This is also why this definition, along with other definitions in rule 54 that pertain to federal criminal jurisdiction were illegally deleted from the FRCrP in violation of Title 28 U.S.C., Sec 2074 on December 1, 2002.
I have found Jon Roland’s paper on the Commerce Clause to properly explain how the federal government can legally prosecute an act committed outside its jurisdiction:
Original Understanding of the Commerce Clause
by Jon Roland
Most federal criminal legislation is based on either the tax or commerce clauses, but competent historians of the Founding Era will find that these clauses do not authorize criminal legislation.
As originally understood, interstate "commerce" consisted only of the transfer of ownership and possession, for a valuable consideration, of tangible commodities, from a party in one state to a party in another state. It did not include primary production, such as farming, hunting, fishing, or mining. It did not include services, securities, or communication. Nor did it include manufacturing, transport, retail sales, possession, or use of anything. It did not include anything that might have a "substantial effect" on commerce, or the operations of parties not directly related to the actual transfers of ownership and possession.
It also did not include all "traffic". There is an implied power to regulate traffic to the extent necessary to separate commercial traffic from noncommercial, such as to require that traffic move through ports of entry and be subject to inspection, but once noncommercial traffic is identified as such it is no longer constitutionally subject to regulation. However, carrying human passengers would not qualify as commercial traffic, even through it might be done for hire, because humans are not tangible commodities being traded — with the temporizing exception of slaves until the logical incompatibility of slavery with the language of the Constitution could be resolved.
The decision in Gibbons was correct, but the justification in the opinion was not. The authority for regulating coastal traffic rests on the Defense Clause, which implies the power to control entry onto the territory of the nation and the approaches to it. See my commentary at http://www.constitution.org/ussc/022-001jr.htm.
Further, as originally understood, the power to "regulate" was not the power to prohibit, nor did it imply the power to impose criminal penalties for violations. While a "regulation" might be considered as the prohibition of some modalities of something, like packaging, labeling, handling, routing, or scheduling, it could not be prohibition of all modalities. There must always be some modalities that are permitted. The restriction must be reasonable, and must serve a public purpose, and not favor one segment of the market over another.
Similarly, as originally understood, the power to tax did not imply the power to impose criminal penalties for violations, only civil penalties, such as fines, or forfeitures of the actual property on which taxes had not been paid.
Today, judicial proceedings in which the petitioner seeks punitive deprivations of property, such as fines, is treated in criminal court rather than civil, even though, inconsistently, courts will treat punitive damages, in rem forfeitures, or deprivations of privileges, as "civil". But in the Founding Era, "crimes" were acts punishable by deprivations of life, limb, or liberty. "Limb" was a term of art that meant corporal punishment.
The original Constitution delegated authority to the national government to punish as crimes, committed on state territory, only a limited number of subjects: (1) treason (Art. III Sec. 3 Cl. 2); (2) counterfeiting (Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 6); (3) piracy or felonies on the high seas; (4) offenses against the "laws of nations" (Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 10); or (5) violations of discipline by military or militia personnel (Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 14). This was emphasized in constitutional ratifying conventions, and again in the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, authored by Thomas Jefferson, although he omitted the last one. [See below, or at http://www.constitution.org/rf/kr_1798.htm]
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
November 10th, 1798.
THE House, according to the standing order of the day, resolved itself into a committee of the whole on the state of the commonwealth, Mr. Caldwell in the chair; and after some time spent therein, the Speaker resumed the chair, and Mr. Caldwell reported that the committee had, according to order, had under consideration the Governor’s address, and had come to the following resolutions thereupon, which he delivered in at the clerk’s table, where they were twice read and agreed to by the House.
1. Resolved, That the several states composing the United States of America, are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general government; but that by compact, under the style and title of a Constitution for the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general government for special purposes, delegated to that government certain definite powers, reserving, each state to itself the residuary mass of right to their own self-government; and that whensoever the general government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force: That to this compact each state acceded as a state, and is an integral party, its co-states forming as to itself, the other party: That the government created by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions, as of the mode and measure of redress. [underline added for emphasis]
2. Resolved, That the Constitution of the United States having delegated to Congress a power to punish treason, counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States, piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the laws of nations, and no other crimes whatever, and it being true as a general principle, and one of the amendments to the Constitution having also declared, "that the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people;" therefore, also, the same act of Congress, passed on the 14th day of July, 1798, and entitled, "an act in addition to the act entitled, an act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States;" as also the act passed by them on the 27th day of June, 1798, entitled, "an act to punish frauds committed on the Bank of the United States," (and all other their acts which assume to create, define, or punish crimes other than those enumerated in the Constitution,) are altogether void, and of no force, and that the power to create, define, and punish such other crimes is reserved, and of right appertains, solely and exclusively, to the respective states, each within its own territory. [underline added for emphasis]
3. Resolved, That it is true as a general principle, and is also expressly declared by one of the amendments to the Constitution, that " the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people;" and that no power over the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press, being delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, all lawful powers respecting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the states, or to the people ; that thus was manifested their determination to retain to themselves the right of judging how far the licentiousness of speech and of the press may be abridged without lessening their useful freedom, and how far those abuses which cannot be separated from their use, should be tolerated rather than the use be destroyed; and thus also they guarded against all abridgment by the United States of the freedom of religious opinions and exercises, and retained to themselves the right of protecting the same. as this state by a law passed on the general demand of its citizens, had already protected them from all human restraint or interference: and that in addition to this general principle and express declaration, another and more special provision has been made by one of the amendments to the Constitution, which expressly declares, that " Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press," thereby guarding in the same sentence, and under the same words, the freedom of religion, of speech, and of the press, insomuch, that whatever violates either, throws down the sanctuary which covers the others, and that libels, falsehoods, and defamations, equally with heresy and false religion, are withheld from the cognizance of federal tribunals: that therefore the act of the Congress of the United States, passed on the 14th day of July, 1798, entitled, "an act in addition to the act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States," which does abridge the freedom of the press, is not law, but is altogether void and of no effect.
4. Resolved, That alien-friends are under the jurisdiction and protection of the laws of the state wherein they are; that no power over them has been delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the individual states distinct from their power over citizens; and it being true as a general principle, and one of the amendments to the Constitution having also declared, that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people," the act of the Congress of the United States, passed on the 22d day of June, 1798, entitled "an act concerning aliens," which assumes power over alien-friends not delegated by the Constitution, is not law, but is altogether void and of no force.
5. Resolved, That in addition to the general principle as well as the express declaration, that powers not delegated are reserved, another and more special provision inserted in the Constitution, from abundant caution, has declared, "that the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808:" that this commonwealth does admit the migration of alien-friends described as the subject of the said act concerning aliens; that a provision against prohibiting their migration, is a provision against all acts equivalent thereto, or it would be nugatory; that to remove them when migrated, is equivalent to a prohibition of their migration, and is therefore contrary to the said provision of the Constitution, and void.
6. Resolved, That the imprisonment of a person under the protection of the laws of this commonwealth, on his failure to obey the simple order of the President, to depart out of the United States, as is undertaken by the said act, entitled "an act concerning aliens," is contrary to the Constitution, one amendment to which has provided, that "no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law," and that another having provided, "that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a public trial by an impartial jury, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence," the same act undertaking to authorize the President to remove a person out of the United States, who is under the protection of the law, on his own suspicion, without accusation, without jury, without public trial, without confrontation of the witnesses against him, without having witnesses in his favour, without defence, without counsel, is contrary to these provisions, also, of the Constitution, is therefore not law, but utterly void and of no force.
That transferring the power of judging any person who is under the protection of the laws, from the courts to the President of the United States, as is undertaken by the same act, concerning aliens, is against the article of the Constitution which provides, that "the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in courts, the judges of which shall hold their offices during good behaviour," and that the said act is void for that reason also; and it is further to be noted, that this transfer of judiciary power is to that magistrate of the General Government, who already possesses all the executive, and a qualified negative in all the legislative powers.
7. Resolved, That the construction applied by the General Government, (as is evinced by sundry of their proceedings,) to those parts of the Constitution of the United States which delegates to Congress a power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States, and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or any department thereof, goes to the destruction of all the limits prescribed to their power by the Constitution: that words meant by that instrument to be subsidiary only to the execution of the limited powers, ought not to be so construed as themselves to give unlimited powers, nor a part so to be taken, as to destroy the whole residue of the instrument: that the proceedings of the General Government under colour of these articles, will be a fit and necessary subject for revisal and correction at a time of greater tranquility, while those specified in the preceding resolutions call for immediate redress.
8. Resolved, That the preceding resolutions be transmitted to the senators and representatives in Congress from this commonwealth, who are hereby enjoined to present the same to their respective houses, and to use their best endeavours to procure, at the next session of Congress, a repeal of the aforesaid unconstitutional and obnoxious acts.
9. Resolved, lastly, That the Governor of this commonwealth be, and is hereby authorized and requested to communicate the preceding resolutions to the legislatures of the several states, to assure them that this commonwealth considers union for specified national purposes, and particularly for those specified in their late federal compact, to be friendly to the peace, happiness, and prosperity of all the states: that, faithful to that compact, according to the plain intent and meaning in which it was understood and acceded to by the several parties, it is sincerely anxious for its preservation : that it does also believe, that to take from the states all the powers of self-government, and transfer them to a general and consolidated government, without regard to the special obligations and reservations solemnly agreed to in that compact, is not for the peace, happiness or prosperity of these states: and that therefore, this commonwealth is determined, as it doubts not its co-states are, tamely to submit to undelegated and consequently unlimited powers in no man or body of men on earth: that if the acts before specified should stand, these conclusions would flow from them; that the general government may place any act they think proper on the list of crimes, and punish it themselves, whether enumerated or not enumerated by the Constitution, as cognizable by them; that they may transfer its cognizance to the President or any other person, who may himself be the accuser, counsel, judge and jury, whose suspicions may be the evidence, his order the sentence, his officer the executioner, and his breast the sole record of the transaction; that a very numerous and valuable description of the inhabitants of these states being, by this precedent, reduced as outlaws to the absolute dominion of one man, and the barrier of the Constitution thus swept away from us all, no rampart now remains against the passions and the power of a majority of Congress, to protect from a like exportation or other more grievous punishment the minority of the same body, the legislatures, judges, governors, and counsellors of the states, nor their other peaceable inhabitants who may venture to reclaim the constitutional rights and liberties of the states and people, or who, for other causes, good or bad, may be obnoxious to the views, or marked by the suspicions of the President, or be thought dangerous to his or their elections, or other interests public or personal: that the friendless alien has indeed been selected as the safest subject of a first experiment; but the citizen will soon follow, or rather has already followed; for, already has a sedition-act marked him as its prey: that these and successive acts of the same character, unless arrested on the threshold, may tend to drive these states into revolution and blood, and will furnish new calumnies against republican governments, and new pretexts for those who wish it to be believed, that man cannot be governed but by a rod of iron: that it would be a dangerous delusion, were a confidence in the men of our choice, to silence our fears for the safety of our rights: that confidence is everywhere the parent of despotism; free government is founded in jealousy, and not in confidence; it is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited constitutions to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with power: that our Constitution has accordingly fixed the limits to which and no further our confidence may go; and let the honest advocate of confidence read the alien and sedition-acts, and say if the Constitution has not been wise in fixing limits to the government it created, and whether we should be wise in destroying those limits? Let him say what the government is if it be not a tyranny, which the men of our choice have conferred on the President, and the President of our choice has assented to and accepted, over the friendly strangers, to whom the mild spirit of our country and its laws had pledged hospitality and protection: that the men of our choice have more respected the bare suspicions of the President, than the solid rights of innocence, the claims of justification, the sacred force of truth, and the forms and substance of law and justice. In questions of power, then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief, by the chains of the Constitution. That this commonwealth does, therefore, call on its co-states for an expression of their sentiments on the acts concerning aliens, and for the punishment of certain crimes herein before specified, plainly declaring whether these acts are or are not authorized by the Federal compact. And it doubts not that their sense will be so announced, as to prove their attachment unaltered to limited government, whether general or particular, and that the rights and liberties of their co-states, will be exposed to no dangers by remaining embarked on a common bottom with their own: That they will concur with this commonwealth in considering the said acts as so palpably against the Constitution, as to amount to an undisguised declaration, that the compact is not meant to be the measure of the powers of the general government, but that it will proceed in the exercise over these states of all powers whatsoever: That they will view this as seizing the rights of the states, and consolidating them in the hands of the general government with a power assumed to bind the states, (not merely in cases made federal,) but in all cases whatsoever, by laws made, not with their consent, but by others against their consent: That this would be to surrender the form of government we have chosen, and to live under one deriving its powers from its own will, and not from our authority; and that the co-states, recurring to their natural right in cases not made federal, will concur in declaring these acts void and of no force and will each unite with this commonwealth, in requesting their repeal at the next session of Congress.
EDMUND BULLOCK, S. H. R.
JOHN CAMPBELL, S. S. P. T.
Passed the House of Representatives, Nov. 10th, 1798.
Attest, THOMAS TODD, C. H. R.
In Senate, November 13th, 1798, unanimously concurred in.
Attest, B. THRUSTON, Clk. Sen.
Approved November 16th, 1798. JAMES GARRARD, G. K.
By the Governor. HARRY TOULMIN,
Secretary of State.
As originally understood, the "Necessary and Proper" clause (Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 18), only implied powers to administer delegated powers, not all powers that might be useful or convenient to achieve a purpose for which the delegated powers might be exercised. It may be necessary and proper to hire workers, build buildings and equipment, and issue paperwork, but not to pressure or penalize someone for not doing something the government does not have the power to do directly. In general, the powers to "tax", "borrow", "regulate", "establish", "promote", "secure", "constitute", "declare", "grant", "provide", "make rules", "prohibit", and "punish", were all distinct, none implied by another. Thus, it is not correct to imply a power to punish (disable a right of life, limb or liberty) from a power to tax or regulate.
The only delegation of what are called "police powers" was confined to parcels of territory ceded to the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of Congress under Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 17, such as the District of Columbia, and things like arsenals, dockyards, etc. Although many such "federal enclaves" have been created since the Constitution was adopted, they are limited in extent. See "Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States — Report of the Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States" (1956). [See http://www.constitution.org/juris/fjur/fed_jur.htm]
It has been held by some that Congress also has police powers on federal territory that has not been admitted as a state, under Art. IV Sec. 3 Cl. 2, but historical analysis indicates this clause only authorized Congress to organize such territories, and that any police powers had to arise from local governments that it might create, not from Congress directly. The model for this is the 1787 Northwest Ordinance. [See http://www.constitution.org/cons/northwes.htm]
It is important to understand that as originally understood, such territorial jurisdiction was strictly limited. By the laws of nations doctrine, a criminal offense was "committed" under the exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereign of the territory where the offender was at the moment the irreversible act was united with criminal intent. In recent decades there has been a "jurisdiction creep" and assertions of "extraterritorial jurisdiction" over criminal offenses, but that is unconstitutional.
It is often argued that court precedents do not support the above interpretations, and that courts are bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to make their decisions primarily on the basis of the most recent precedents, rather than always returning to the black letter law, especially the Constitution, and to historical analysis of what the lawgivers meant by the words they chose. It is argued that "stability" of the law is more important than conformity to "original understanding". The problem with that doctrine is that it conflicts with the main reason why the Founders adopted a written constitution, rather than relying on the unwritten constitution that had been the tradition in Britain. Written constitutions were to get away from the drift into absurdity that often result when chains of precedent are allowed to drift away from some original, fixed, fundamental law. Stare decisis has a limited role in clarifying the fuzzy boundaries of the black letter law, but only after historical and textual analysis has been exhausted, and not to depart from the original meaning or to make "informal amendments" to the written law, especially to written constitutions.
At the moment, most federal criminal legislation is unconstitutional if applied to offenses committed on state territory, or on the territories of foreign nations. Some of it, which conflicts with the rights recognized in the Constitution, including the unenumerated rights of the Ninth Amendment, are unconstitutional everywhere, even in federal enclaves. This particularly applies to federal directives and regulations applied to persons not under contractual supervision of a federal official. It is a violation of Art. I Sec. 1 to delegate to administrative agencies the power to make rules for ordinary civilians that amount to statutes. Agencies may only exercise what is called the "ordinance power" over employees, some contractors, visitors to government proprietary facilities, or users of government assets, and except for military or militia personnel in actual service, the only penalties that may be imposed are termination of the contract and loss of the privileges enjoyed under that contract. The importance of this point can be seen in the fact that most of the penal and tax code consists of administrative regulations and not statutes.
Any conscientious and competent historian approaching the current state of constitutional law confronts what can only be called tyranny, in the original sense of the exercise of unlawful power. Such powers might be popular with some constituent groups, but we must all realize that anyone who takes an oath to "preserve, protect, and defend" the Constitution is in immediate conflict with the established legal order, and that oath obliges the oathtaker to actively resist the usurpations, perhaps even with deadly force, the usurpations that so many have ignorantly come to accept.
For more on this topic see
"The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause", Randy E. Barnett, 68 U. Chicago Law Review 101. http://www.bu.edu/rbarnett/Original.htm
"Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress’s Power to Regulate Commerce, Robert H. Bork and Daniel E. Troy. Paper delivered at symposium sponsored by U.S. Chamber of Commerce. http://www.constitution.org/lrev/bork-troy.htm
"How stare decisis Subverts the Law", Jon Roland, Jun. 10, 2000. http://www.constitution.org/col/0610staredrift.htm
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In what was probably the most significant U. S. Supreme Court decision during the last 20 years, decided April 26, 1995, the Court addresses the issues of exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the Congress, the powers of the Federal Government, and the subsequent subject matter jurisdiction of a Federal District Court. Justice Thomas in his concurring majority opinion in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626, states very clearly:
"Indeed, on this crucial point, the majority and Justice Bryer [the Justice writing the dissenting opinion] agree in principle: the Federal Government has nothing approaching a police power."
Justice Thomas went on to discuss a "regulation of police,’ wherein he stated: "United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall 41 (1870), marked the first time the court struck down a federal law as exceeding the power conveyed by the Commerce Clause. In a two-page opinion, the court invalidated a nationwide law prohibiting all sales of naphtha and illuminating oils. In doing so, the Court remarked that the Commerce Clause ’ has always been understood as limited by its terms; and as a virtual denial of any power to interfere with the trade and business of the separate States.’ Id., at 44. The law in question was ‘plainly a regulation of police,’ which could not have constitutional [United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 545 (1995), application only where Congress had exclusive authority, such as the territories. Id., at 44-45. See also License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 470-471 (1867) (Congress cannot regulate internal commerce and thus may not establish national trademark registration."
"Although we have supposedly applied the substantial effect test for the past 60 years, we always have rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would Lopez, supra permit Congress to exercise a police power; our cases are quite clear that there are real limits to federal power. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (slip op., at 7), ([N]o one disputes the proposition that ’ [t]he Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers,’ ) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). Cf. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 435 (1793) (Iredell, J) (‘Each state in the Union is sovereign as to all the powers reserved. It must necessarily be so, because the United States have no claim to any authority but such as the states have surrendered to them’ ). Indeed, on this crucial point, the majority and Justice Breyer agree in principle: the Federal Government has nothing approaching a police power. Compare ante, at 7-9 with post, at 10-11."
Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States and intentionally violates the Constitution, and, engages in acts in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land he / she can be considered to have committed treason. Judges are required to make sure jurisdiction exists regardless whether or not counsel raises the issue. There is no statute of limitations on jurisdiction, which means criminal cases tried at federal courthouses sitting inside "exclusive state jurisdiction’ can be overturned at any time.
If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he / she is without jurisdiction, and he / she has engaged in an act or acts of treason.
Whenever a judge acts where he / she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 [(1980) clarification added]; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821). This places serious responsibility on all federal employees who may be in a position to stop the criminal acts. [See Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 4].
In the Brzonkala / Morrison et al, 4th Circuit case 169 F. 3d 820 (1999). In that case the Supreme Court affirmed the 4th Circuit’s en banc decision that a federal civil statute, although enacted by Congress [42 U.S.C. - 13981] was unconstitutional, citing Lopez a criminal case. Justice Rehnquest writing for the majority,
"Congress therefore may not regulate non-economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on the conducts aggregate effect on interstate commerce." [Case No. 99-5].
Justice Rehnquest makes it perfectly clear in Brzonkala that Congress has no extra-territorial authority on its own,
"As we stated in Lopez, [S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so. 514 U.S. at 557, n. 2 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 311 (Rehnquest, J. concurring in judgment)).
Rather ’ [w]hether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled only by this court.’ 514 U.S. at 557, n. 2 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 273 (Black J. concurring)." [underscore added for emphasis].
Justice Rehnquest says Congress’ constitutional power to regulate outside its territory "… can only be settled by this court." This is the most important official U.S. Supreme Court position in decades. He says Congress does not have the authority to establish extra-territorial jurisdiction.
NOTE: The U.S. Supreme Court followed this line of decision making in the next two jurisdictional decisions after Lopez…see Morrison and Jones.
In Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion in the Brzonkala / Morrison et al case, he sums up the federal government’s attempt to enforce a nationwide police power. Justice Thomas says,
"Until this Court replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more consistent with the original understanding, we will continue to see Congress appropriating state police power under the guise of regulating commerce."
The law in this country has been consistent on this issue for over 200 years, since the signing of the Declaration of Independence. The government cannot act in "bad faith,’
"But while he prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88.
As difficult as it may be,
"The Judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass by it because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution." Clipper v. Takoma Park, Md., 898 F. 2d 18, 21 (4th Cir. 1989) quoting Cohens V. Virginia, 19 U.S. at 404. [underscore added for emphasis].
In conclusion, the Lopez court rejected every argument the government had regarding Federal authority to regulate violent crime nationwide. The court said,
"We rejected these ’ costs of crime ’ and ’ national productivity ’ arguments because they would permit Congress to regulate not only violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce."
Usurpation of power is serious. Treason to the Constitution is serious. Therefore, jurisdiction must be established in every federal case regardless of whether the parties raise the issue or not and if the case is outside the established territory of the "United States’ only the U.S. Supreme Court can determine if the Federal Government has legislative jurisdiction, and they must follow the Constitution. For this reason the definitions deleted from Rule 54 and Rule 1 last year outside the knowledge of Congress, in violation of Title 28 U.S.C., Sec. 2074, could be interpreted as an attempt to rewrite the U.S. Constitution.
Former Rule 54 (c) definitions illegally deleted:
ILLEGAL ACTS – Changes to Rule 54 without Congressional Approval
I. " ‘Act of Congress’ – [Rule 54 (c)] includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession.’ [Clarification - Federal Zone]… {Illegally Deleted December 1, 2002}
This definition reflects Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 17 – U.S. Constitution, which states;
"The Congress shall have the powers to exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by cession of particular states and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States, [District of Columbia] and to exercise like authority over all places [federal enclaves] purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock yards and other needful Buildings; And to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.’ – and,
Article IV, Sec. 3, cl. 2, which states;
"The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.’
The jurisdictional area of the United States is limited exclusively to the District of Columbia (not exceeding a ten mile square) and the Possessions and Territories (i.e., Guam, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, etc.) belonging to and under the exclusive Sovereignty of the United States, plus any insular possession [federal enclave] whereby the state has transferred jurisdiction via cession of jurisdiction. The "United States’ does NOT include the 50 states, except for lands which were specifically ceded to the United States for purposes such as setting up military bases, federal buildings, etc. The 50 sovereign states DO NOT belong to the United States. Federal Police Officers cannot enforce federal law in exclusive state jurisdiction unless such law is an extraterritorial law authorized and ruled by the Supreme Court to be constitutional under the Commerce Clause. Only the U.S. Supreme Court can make that decision.
For the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to covertly and deceptively conspire with the U.S. Supreme Court, obtain the aid of West / Thomson Publishing to delete the definition of "Act of Congress’ from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, outside the knowledge of Congress and the American People, is outrageous and illegal. This is the worst example of delineation of states’ rights I have ever seen. It was blatant, premeditated and illegal. It is evidence of the federal government’s panic over massive civil liability for illegally enforcing federal criminal laws within the states where no federal jurisdiction exists because the states[s] never ceded jurisdiction as required by the Constitution, Federal Statute, and State Laws. This includes military bases, federal courthouses, office buildings, post offices, and raw land. Trial Management Associates has been investigating this issue for five years and we have determined that approximately 65-70% of all federal property owned, leased, or controlled by the federal government, acquired after 1940 [See DOJ Criminal Resource Manual Sections 664 & 665], NO FEDERAL JURISDICTION EXISTS! For courthouses this means NO JUDICIAL JURISDICTION, which means all trials have been illegal, unless you take away the states sovereign status, which is impossible. Article III and IV of the U.S. Constitution do not take away any state’s rights with the establishment of Article I and Article III federal courts. As the Ninth Circuit just said in its opinion in Marcus Conant et al v. Walters et al, D.C. No. CV 97-00139-WHA,
"We must show[ ] respect for the sovereign States that compromise our Federal Union.’ [A three-member panel of the US 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco ruled Wednesday {December 17, 2003} that the federal government may not revoke the licenses of doctors who recommend marijuana to their patients. The ruling in Conant v. Walters (originally Conant v. McCaffrey) slaps down a five-year effort by the Justice Department to strangle California’s medical marijuana law by intimidating physicians into not providing required recommendations. It is also a morale-booster for a medical marijuana movement in California that has been battered by adverse Supreme Court decisions and numerous DEA raids on cultivators and providers].
NOTE: By Law, 28 U.S.C., Sec. 2074, the definition of "Act of Congress’ is still enforceable along with all the other changes to Rule 54 outlined in this letter because the deletion[s] / changes were not approved by Congress.
II. " ‘Civil Action’ refers to a civil action in a district court. The words
‘demurrer,’ ‘motion to quash,’ ‘plea in abatement,’ ‘plea in bar,’
or words to the same effect, in any act of Congress shall be construed to mean the motion raising a defense or objection provided in Rule 12." [Illegally deleted December 1, 2002]
Why would they illegally delete the definition of "Civil Action’ from the FRCrP? Because if you look at Title 28 U.S.C., Sec. 1331 it states; [See 18 U.S.C., Sec 5 for Art. III Court’s jurisdiction].
Section 1331. Federal question
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.’
NOTE: By Law, 28 U.S.C., Sec. 2074, the definition of "Civil Action’ is still enforceable because its deletion was not approved by Congress.
III. "District court, includes all district courts named in subdivision
(a) of this rule.’ [Illegally deleted December 1, 2002]
The new definition "Court’ [2003 edition] simply says… "means a federal judge performing functions authorized by law.’ Whose law? The 50 states, or the federal government? Do they mean Art. I Judges, or Art. III Judges? It’s obvious from the next change they intended to give Art. I Judges - Art. III Power. This violates the Constitution.
NOTE: By Law, 28 U.S.C., Sec. 2074, the definition of "District court’ is still enforceable because its deletion was not approved by Congress.
IV. " ‘Federal magistrate judge’ means a United States magistrate judge as defined 28 U.S.C. Sec. 631-639, a judge of the United States or another
judge or judicial officer specifically empowered by statute in force in any
territory or possession, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia, to perform a function to which a particular rule relates.’ [Illegally deleted December 1, 2002, without Congressional approval – still enforceable]
There is a new definition for "Judge’ as of December 1, 2002 at I. b (4);
(4) ‘‘Judge” means a federal judge or a state or local judicial officer.
[This definition was not approved by Congress] This is an obvious attempt to expand the authority of Art. I. Judges. " ‘Judge of the United States’ includes a judge of a district court, court of appeals, or the Supreme Court.’ [Illegally deleted December 1,
2002 – replaced with new definitions of Federal judge not approved by
Congress].
(3) ‘‘Federal judge” means:
(A) a justice or judge of the United States as these terms are defined in
28 U.S.C. § 451;
(B) a magistrate judge; and
(C) a judge confirmed by the United States Senate and empowered by statute in any commonwealth, territory, or possession to perform a function to which a particular rule relates.
NOTE: As you can see the Committee and the U.S. Supreme Court have now given all federal judges [Art. I included] the powers of Art. III Judges, which is not legal as any case involving "private rights’ requires an Art. III judge. Below is a Memorandum from a former U.S. Assistant Attorney General.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF VESTING MAGISTRATE JUDGES WITH
JURISDICTION OVER ASSET FORFEITURE CASES
A statute vesting jurisdiction over asset forfeiture cases in magistrate judges would violate Article III of the Constitution. December 6, 1993
MEMORANDUM TO STEF CASSELLA DEPUTY DIRECTOR, POLICY AND LITIGATION
ASSET FORFEITURE OFFICE
You have asked whether Congress may constitutionally enact a statute requiring that asset forfeiture cases involving property valued below a certain level be heard by a United States Magistrate Judge rather than a United States District Judge. The limitations imposed by Article III forbid Congress to assign jurisdiction over such cases to a Magistrate Judge without the assent of the parties. Therefore, we must advise you that the provision you have described would be unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has explained that the power to adjudicate private rights must be vested in an Article III court. Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63-76 (1982) (plurality opinion). Although the adjudication of public rights need not be assigned to an Article III court, both civil and criminal forfeiture cases involve disputes over private, not public, rights. The Court has held that no criminal case can be conceptualized as a public rights dispute even though the United States is a party to all criminal proceedings. Id. at 70 n.24 (citing United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955)). Similarly, the Court has ruled that Congress generally "cannot `withdraw from [Art. III] judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty,’" id. at 69 n.23 (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 284 (1856)), and every civil forfeiture action indubitably constitutes a matter that is the subject of a suit at the common law or in equity. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-83 (1974) (tracing history of forfeiture).
Congress has the authority in some situations to "fashion causes of action that are closely analogous to common-law claims and place them beyond the ambit of" Article III, Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 52 (1989) (discussing congressional authority to abrogate Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury), but the Supreme Court has only sustained the exercise of this authority when Congress creates a regulatory framework that includes administrative adjudication of such claims. See Atlas Roofing v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 450-61 (1977) (collecting cases); see also Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 51-52; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932).
Absent the creation of a separate administrative mechanism for administration and adjudication of civil forfeitures, such cases must be assigned in the first instance to Article III judges. Assignment of such cases to Magistrate Judges, who are mere adjuncts to United States District Judges, see Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 872 (1989), cannot satisfy the Article III requirement.
In upholding 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), which authorizes Magistrate Judges to conduct civil trials with the consent of the parties, the en banc Ninth Circuit stated "that parties to a case or controversy in a federal forum are entitled to have the cause determined by Article III judges." Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1984) (Kennedy, J.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984). Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a "mandatory provision for trial of an unrestricted class of civil cases by a magistrate and not by Article III judges would violate the constitutional rights of the litigants." Id. at 542. Based upon this rule, any statute vesting jurisdiction over federal forfeiture cases — even a limited class of civil forfeiture cases involving small amounts of money — in federal Magistrate Judges would almost certainly be constitutionally infirm.
Walter Dellinger Assistant U.S. Attorney General
VI. " ‘Magistrate judge’ includes a United States magistrate judge as defined in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 631-639, a judge of the United States , another judge or judicial officer specifically empowered by statute in force in any territory or possession, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia, to perform a function to which a particular rule relates, and a state or local judicial officer, authorized by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3041 to perform the functions prescribed in Rules 3, 4, and 5.’ [Illegally deleted December 1, 2002, still enforceable]
They also added without Congressional approval the following definition at I. b (5);
(5) ‘‘Magistrate judge” means a United States magistrate judge as defined in 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639.
VII. " ‘Oath’ includes affirmations.’ [Illegally replaced with I. b (6) without Congressional approval]
I. b (6) ‘‘Oath” includes an affirmation. [Perhaps they intend to change the Oath to exclude upholding the U.S. Constitution]
VIII. " ‘State’ includes District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, territory and insular possession.’ [Illegally changed December 1, 2002, without
congressional approval and replaced with I. b (9)]
I. b (9) ‘‘State” includes the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.[underline added for emphasis]
NOTE: As you can see they have now legislated for all 50 States by including them under the term "commonwealth’ and deleting "insular possession.’ The term insular possession refers to "federal enclave’ located within a State after having been ceded [jurisdiction] by the state to the federal government. This egregious, illegal change all but eliminated state sovereignty.
They created a new section whereby they have deputized just about everyone except the local priest, rabbi, or minister to act on behalf of the federal government at I. b (10),
[This section was created illegally without the approval of Congress - 28 U.S.C., Sec. 2074]
I. b (10) ‘‘State or local judicial officer” means:
(A) a state or local officer authorized to act under 18 U.S.C. § 3041; and
(B) a judicial officer empowered by statute in the District of Columbia or in any commonwealth, territory, or possession to perform a function to which a particular rule relates.
This is an incredible example of creating a federal police state. Just read 18 U.S.C., Sec. 3041 below;
Section 3041. Power of courts and magistrates
For any offense against the United States, the offender may, by any justice or judge of the United States, or by any United States magistrate judge, or by any chancellor, judge of a supreme or superior court, chief or first judge of the common pleas, mayor of a city, justice of the peace, or other magistrate, of any state where the offender may be found, and at the expense of the United States, be arrested and imprisoned or released as provided in chapter 207 of this title, as the case may be, for trial before such court of the United States as by law has cognizance of the offense. Copies of the process shall be returned as speedily as may be into the office of the clerk of such court, together with the recognizances of the witnesses for their appearances to testify in the case.
A United States judge or magistrate judge shall proceed under this section according to rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States. Any state judge or magistrate acting hereunder may proceed according to the usual mode of procedure of his state but his acts and orders shall have no effect beyond determining, pursuant to the provisions of section 3142 of this title, whether to detain or conditionally release the prisoner prior to trial or to discharge him from arrest.
NOTE: Perfect example of how they have expanded the power of Art. I Judges giving them Art. III power, except, now they have empowered non U.S. Officials to act on the behalf of the federal government in criminal matters. This clearly violates the U.S. Constitution.
"mayor of a city, justice of the peace, or other magistrate, of
any state where the offender may be found, and at the expense of the United States, be arrested and imprisoned or released…’
Remember they changed the definition of state [I. b (9)] to include commonwealth. The definition of commonwealth is;
commonwealth – noun
1. the people of a state or nation viewed politically; body politic
2. a state or nation in which the people possess sovereignty; republic
3. the body politic organized for the general good
4. a group of persons united by some common interest
Another new section has been added without Congressional approval at I. (c);
I. (c) Authority of a Justice or Judge of the United States.
When these rules authorize a magistrate judge to act, any other federal judge may also. In addition to the definitions illegally changed without Congressional approval the terms in 54 (a) & (b)(1)(2) have been deleted without authority.
a) Courts.
These rules apply to all criminal proceedings in the United States District Courts; in the District (FOOTNOTE 1 ) of Guam; in the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, except as otherwise provided in articles IV and V of the covenant provided by the Act of March 24, 1976 (90 Stat. 263); in the District Court of the Virgin Islands; and (except as otherwise provided in the Canal Zone) (FOOTNOTE 2 ) in the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone; in the United States Courts of Appeals; and in the Supreme Court of the United States; except that the prosecution of offenses in the District Court of the Virgin Islands shall be by indictment or information as otherwise provided by law .
(b) Proceedings.
(1) Removed Proceedings.
These rules apply to criminal prosecutions removed to the United States district courts from state courts and govern all procedure after removal, except that dismissal by the attorney for the prosecution shall be governed by state law.
(2) Offenses Outside a District or State.
These rules apply to proceedings for offenses committed upon the high seas or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district, except that such proceedings may be had in any district authorized by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3238.
As you can see the parties involved with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have taken "Usurpation of Power’ to a new level. This conduct is outrageous, illegal, and unacceptable, especially considering they only told Congress they were transferring all definitions in former Rule 54 (c) to Rule 1. I will now show you undeniable evidence of the greatest conspiracy in U.S. History that rises to the level of Treason. Remember the words of the 4th Circuit [Rule of Law for the Circuit] quoting the U.S. Supreme Court;
"The Judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass by it because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution." Clipper v. Takoma Park, Md., 898 F. 2d 18, 21 (4th Cir. 1989) quoting Cohens V. Virginia, 19 U.S. at 404. [underscore added for emphasis].
This incredible conspiracy begins with the memorandum from Leonidas Ralph Mecham to the Chief Justice, inclusive of the proposed amendments to the FRCrP for 2002. [See Exhibit A]. Next are the letters from Chief Justice Rehenquist to the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. [See Exhibits B & C]. Included with the letters are the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCrP). [Exhibit D - included are identifying cover pages and only that portion that refers to Rule 54 ]. By examining exhibit D you can see that all the changes I have shown you in Rule 54, none of them are listed in the proposed amendments sent to Congress. In fact the only mention for Rule 54 [Exhibit D] is the following;
"The definitions contained in Rule 54 (Application and Exception) would be transferred to Rule 1 under the proposed amendments.’
The Minutes of the Advisory Committee Meeting on FRCrP, April 25-26, 2002, Washington, D.C. [Exhibit E], do not even mention Rule 54, much less any changes to the Rule. There is no mention of changes to Rule 54 outlined in this brief in the 2001 Minutes, or, 2000 Minutes of the Advisory Committee for FRCrP.
The letter [Memorandum - Exhibit F] from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts dated November 29, 2002, addressed to all Federal Judges, Federal Public Defenders, and all federal court personnel makes no mention of changes to Rule 54, yet it states;
"Congress has taken no action on the amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate, bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, approved by the
Supreme Court on April 29, 2002. Accordingly, the amendments to the
rules will take effect December 1, 2002,’
And then it lists the changes. No mention of Rule 54 being changed in any way.
The "CRIMINAL RULES DOCKET’ [Exhibit G - included are identifying cover pages and only that portion that refers to Rule 54] lists all changes to all rules FRCrP from 1987 through October 31, 2003, yet there is no mention of the changes outlined in this brief regarding Rule 54.
The final edition of the House copy of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [Exhibit H - included are identifying cover pages and only that portion that refers to Rule 54], printed for the use of "The Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, signed by the Chairman of the Committee – F. James Sessenbrenner, Jr., prepared and printed by the U.S. Government Printing Office Washington: 2002, states in the Table of Contents;
"Rule 54. (Transferred)………………………208’
and on page 55 it states, "Rule 54. [Transferred]1 [Footnote 1 states at the bottom of page 55,
______________________________________
"1 All of Rule 54 was moved to Rule 1.’
To show an example of how even the Federal Public Defenders bought into this conspiracy see [Exhibit I – included are identifying cover pages and only that portion that refers to Rule 54] the FRCrP, Application and Practice from Lucien B. Campbell, Federal Public Defender, Western District of Texas, December 2002, which states;
"Rule 54. All of Former Rule 54, Application and Exception, was
transferred to Rule 1.’
The parties to this conspiracy duped the public criminal defense attorneys. What else have they done over the years? How far will they go? What is the end goal? How far does the corruption spread throughout the federal system? These are valid questions you need to get answers to. The entire judicial system and its integrity are at stake. What are you going to do about it? Will you live up to the OATH you took to uphold the U.S. Constitution?
The attitude of The Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (AO) is distinctly reflected in their legal conduct and beliefs. Last week one of their lawyers told me personally that the AO does not believe in state’s rights and that we should only have one government, that being federal. The illegal actions taken by the parties who control the Rules of the court in regards to Rule 54, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2002, says it all. What other illegal changes have been made to the Court’s Rules, whether it be Civil, Bankruptcy, etc… Where is it going to stop?
We at TMA International Trusts say, "The corruption cannot continue."
The abuse cannot continue. The motive can only be an attempt to cover-up the enormous usurpation of power at federal properties located within the 50 States since 1940. This is based on the FACT that jurisdiction was never legally transferred by the state[s] to the federal government, via cession of jurisdiction for most of the locations. We have discovered that approximately 65-70% of all federal properties [owned, leased or controlled by the federal government] lack federal jurisdiction. This includes military bases, military installations, federal courts, federal office building, federal land, DOJ Installations. As the court itself has said,
"We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution."
What happened in 2002 regarding Rule 54 - Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rises to the level of TREASON. It is obvious that no one has the courage to stand up and be counted in the effort to save our "System of Justice.’ The U.S. Supreme Court has demonstrated that "Politics’ and Federal Power over States rule the land. Our system of justice as established by the Constitution no longer exists. As a nation who leads the "Free World’ we, "The People’ should be ashamed for allowing this to happen, and worse, two years after the fact we allow it to continue.
TMA INTERNATIONAL TRUSTS
Phone: (206)-350-1143 Fax: (775)-871-8373 E-mail: info@tmaittma.com
www.tmaittma.com – http://tmait.blogs.com
A PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT COMPANY
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